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IN --rHE SUPREME COURT 
OF r-l~HE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ST:\ TE ()f l ~·rAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
c:H.\RLES ORVEL COLSTON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 10076 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
ST£\TE~lENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Charles Orvel Colston, has appealed 
from a conviction for the crime of operating a vehicle on a 
public high\\·ay in the State of Utah with a gross laden 
\\·eight more than for \vhich the vehicle was registered, in 
violation of-t 1-1-128, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant \\·as charged by complaint in the City 
Court of Price, l~ tah, "·ith operating a vehicle which 
\veighed in excess of the \veight for which it \\·as registered. 
The appellant \\·as convicted and thereafter appealed his 
conviction to the District Court in and for Carbon County, 
State of lrtah. The trial \\·as held thereon on the 6th day 
of December, 1963, before the Honorable Henry Ruggeri, 
Judge. sitting ,,·ithout jury. The appellant was convicted 
of the crime charged and appealed the conviction to the 
Supreme Court. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the conviction should be 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 2nd day of February, 1963, the appellant, 
Charles Colston, pulled a 1957 pickup truck, towing a 30-
foot house trailer, into the Peerless Checking Station, Price 
Canyon, Carbon County, Utah (R-8). The vehicle was 
weighed by the Highway Patrol ( R-8), and found to weigh 
15,400 pounds. This was the weight of the combination 
pickup truck and house trailer. A stencil on the pickup 
truck indica ted that the registration of the vehicle was for 
only 12,000 pounds (R-8, 13). Upon the combination 
vehicle being weighed, Officer Bill Himes of the Utah 
Highway Patrol had a discussion with the appellant, 
wherein he told the appellant that the unit was registered 
for 12,000 pounds and that it weighed 15,400 pounds. The 
appellant made no protest that the unit was not registered 
for 12,000 pounds, but only indicated that he had never 
been stopped before. Officer Himes thereafter cited the 
appellant for operating a vehicle over the registered gross 
weight. 
The appellant presented no evidence, but counsel for 
the appellant in the District Court made an opening state-
ment by way of offer of proof in which it was indicated that 
the appellant had registered the vehicle for a 12,000-pound 
gross laden \veigh t. 
At the time of trial in the District Court, the complaint 
charged the appellant with violation of 41-1-134, U.C.A. 
1953. Thereafter, upon motion of the District Attorney, 
the numerical charge \\·as changed to 41-1-127, U.C.A. 
1953. The substance of the complaint, however, clearly 
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charged the defendant with operating a vehicle which was 
registered for 12,000 pounds when the vehicle weighed 
15;~00 pounds. Thus, the substance of the charge was for 
operating a vehicle over the weight for which it was regis-




THE APPELLANT WAS CONVICTED OF THE OFFENSE 
CHARGED SINCE THE NUMERICAL DESIGNATION OF 
THE OFFENSE TO A CORRESPONDING SECTION OF THE 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED WAS MERE SURPLUSAGE AND 
A DEFECT NOT GOING TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE 
CRIME CHARGED. 
The appellant contends that he was convicted of a crime 
other than the one charged. The complaint with which the 
appellant was charged stated that: 
"***on or about the 2nd day of February, A.D. 1963, at and 
within the County of Carbon, State of Utah, did commit the crime 
of \riolating Section 41-1-127, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
follows: 
That the said defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, 
operated a vehicle upon a public highway, to wit: U.S. 50 & 
6, at Peerless, Carbon County, State of Utah, which said vehi-
cle was registered in that State of Utah for 12,000 pounds, 
and \vhich said vehicle at said time and place, weighed 15,400 
pounds gross weight.'' 
The substance of that complaint remained the same 
when the case was heard on appeal in the District Court in 
and for Carbon County. The District Attorney made a 
motion to amend the complaint at the outset to change the 
numerical charge from 41-1-134, U.C.A. 1953, to 41-1-
127, U.C.A. 1953 (R-3). The court granted the motion 
over the objection of the appellant. The substance of the 
charge, however, remained the same, in that the detail of 
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the crime with which the appellant was accused was the 
operation of a vehicle registered for 12,000 pounds' weight, 
which in fact weighed 15,400 pounds. Consequently, there 
was no change in the nature of the crime charged nor did 
counsel for the appellant appear to be in any way preju-
diced by the change, since he strongly and vociferously 
argued the constitutionality of the offense with which the 
appellant was charged and clearly was not misled as to the 
nature of the charge pending against the accused (R-14, 
43) . The substance of the crime charged alleges a viola-
tion of 41-1-128, U.C.A. 1953. It is submitted that the 
appellant has no basis for complaint or for reversal. 77-
11-1, U.C.A. 1953, provides as to what a complaint must 
contain: 
"The complaint must state: 
" ( 1 ) The name of the person accused, if known; or if not 
known and it is so stated, he may be designated by any other name. 
"(2) The county in which the offense was committed. 
" ( 3) The general name of the crime or public offense. 
" ( 4) The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the 
crime or public offense named. 
" ( 5) The person against whom or against whose property the 
offense was committed, if known. 
"(6) If the offense is against the property of any person, a gen-
eral description of such property. 
"However, in cases of public offenses triable upon information, 
indictment or accusation, the complaint, the right to a bill of par-
ticulars, and all proceedings and matters in relation thereto, shall 
conform to and be governed by the provisions of the new chapters 
21 and 23 of Title 77, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
chapter 118, La\\·s of Utah, 1935. 
"The complaint must be subscribed and sworn to by the com-
plainant." 
There is no requirement, as can be seen from the above 
provision, that the complaint specify the numerical sec-
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tion of the Code with which an accused is charged to have 
violated. By merely setting forth a section of the Code, the 
complaint added to the substance of the offense charged an 
item of surplusage. 77-21-42, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
u Any allegation unnecessary under the existing law or under the 
provisions of this chapter, may, if contained in an information, 
indictment or bill of particulars, be disregarded, as surplusage." 
This section, when read in conjunction with 77-21-
·l3 ( 1), \\'hich provides: 
"No information or indictment that charges an offense in ac-
cordance with the provisions of section 7 7-21-8 shall be invalid or 
insufficient because of any defect or imperfection in, or omission 
of, any mattt·r of form only, or because of any miswriting, misspell-
ing or improper English, or because of the use of a sign, symbol, 
figure or abbreviation, or because of any similar defect, imperfec-
tion or omission. The court may at any time cause the informa-
tion, indictment or bill of particulars to be amended in respect to 
any such defect, imperfection or omission." 
makes it obvious that mere defects in form are not a basis 
for complaint. Especially is that so where there has been 
a mere error in a particular symbol or figure which is con-
tained 'vithin the complaint which does not change the 
nature of the substantive offense charged. 
In Whartons' Criminal Law and Procedure, Sec. 1770, 
it is stated: 
"* * * Moreover, it is the almost universal rule that when the 
facts, acts, and circumstances are set forth in the body of an indict-
ment or information with sufficient certainty to constitute an of-
fense and to apprise the defendant of the nature of the charge 
against him, a misnomer or inaccurate designation of a crime in 
the caption or other part of the indictment or information will not 
vitiate it; in such case, the statement of facts controls the erroneous 
designation of the offense, and the defendant stands charged with 
~e offense charged in the statement of fact. In many jurisdictions 
lt is held that such erroneous designation of the offense may be dis-
regarded as surplusage. 
"Indictments have been held sufficient, notwithstanding a mis-
nomer or inaccurate designation of the crime alleged, in view of 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
statutes providing in effect that no indictment shall be deemed 
insufficient for any merely formal defect not prejudicing any sub-
stantial right of the defendant, although an indictment which fails 
to name any offense in the charging part thereof is insufficient to 
sustain a conviction." 
In State v. Schnell, 107 Mont. 579, 88 P.2d 19 ( 1939), 
a case similar to the instant one was considered by the 
Montana Supreme Court. The accused was charged with 
the crime of operating a vehicle under the influence of in-
toxicating liquor. The appellant contended that he was 
charged with a crime different than that for which he was 
convicted. The complaint with which the defendant was 
charged had given an erroneous name in that it named the 
offense covered by Sec. 17 41.7, Revised Code of Montana, 
but the facts and circumstances setting out the crime in the 
complaint alleged an offense in violation of Sec. 1746.1, 
Revised Code of Montana. In rejecting the contention that 
the complaint was defective, the Montana Supreme Court 
stated: 
"Here the name given to the offense in the complaint may be 
omitted as surplusage and the information is still sufficient under 
section 17 46.1, because it still characterizes the offense as a mis-
den1eanor and then proceeds to state how, specifically where and 
in what manner it was committed. The erroneous name of the 
offense will be treated as surplusage, since without it the com-
plaint is still sufficient to charge the offense under section 1746.1. 
31 C.J. 747." 
In State v. Scow, 101 Utah 564, 125 P.2d 954 ( 1942), 
this court was concerned with a similar situation to that 
now before the court. The defendant Scow was charged by 
information \vith the crime of pandering, \vhen in fact the 
substantive allegations in the information set forth the 
crime of transportation for the purposes of prostitution. 
The trial court had granted a motion to quash the informa-
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tion. In reversing the trial court and holding the informa-
tion to be proper, the court stated: 
"Though it were conceded that the crime of 'pandering' does 
not encon1pass under our statutes, the act of 'transporting a female 
for the purposes of prostitution,' nevertheless it was error, in the 
instant case, to quash the information. 
~The ahnost universal rule at common law is that a mis-
nonler or inaccurate designation of a crime in the caption or 
other part of the complaint, indictment, or information will 
not vitiate it where there is a sufficient (sic) detailing of the 
facts constituting the offense in the body of the instrument so 
that the defendant is fully apprised of the nature of the charge 
against him. In such case the statement of facts controls the 
erroneous designation of the offense, and the defendant stands 
charged with the offense charged in the statement of facts.' 
121 A.L.R. 1088, 1089. 
Cases cited from many jurisdictions support the text. Especially 
should this rule apply under Sections 105-21-41 and 105-21-42, 
Laws of Utah 1935, c. 118, providing that repugnant allegations 
shall not invalidate an information and that unnecessary allega-
tions tnay be treated as surplusage. Under a similar statute of 
Iowa, where an indictment named the offense of which the de-
fendant was charged as manslaughter, but the facts set out in the 
body of the indictment showed a murder, it was held that the 
court could reject the word 'manslaughter' as surplusage and try 
the defendant for the crime of murder. State v. Davis, 41 Iowa 
311; State v. Sha,v, 35 Iowa 575 . 
.. In the instant case the defendant could not be misled by desig-
nating the crime as 'pandering.' What he is alleged to have done 
is stated. No act under Section 103-51-8 could, under such charge, 
be proved against him. Two crimes are not charged. The word 
'pandering' is used in the information in naming the offense-
not in the charging part of the information. True, under Section 
105-21-6 and 105-21-8, Laws of Utah 1935, c. 118, a crime may 
be charged by using the name given the offense by the common 
law or by statute. But ,,·here, as here, the acts alleged to have been 
committed clearly charge a crime, the incorrect designation of 
such crime - if it be incorrect - should be disregarded." 
In State v. Burke:~ 102 Utah 249, 129 P.2d 560 ( 1942), 
the defendant "·as charged with the crime of gambling 
'"hen in fact the crime alleged in the information was one 
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of gaming. In holding that the misnomer of the offense 
did not affect the substance of the charge, the court stated: 
"An erroneous designation of the offense does not invalidate an 
information if by other proper allegations, the offense charged is 
made clear, and repugnant allegations shall not invalidate an in-
formation. Unnecessary allegations may be treated as surplusage. 
Laws of lhah 1935, Chapter 118, Section 105-21-42; State v. 
Scow, Utah, 125 P.2d 954. 
"The objections to the information are not well taken. State v. 
Hill, 100 Utah 456, 116 P.2d 392; State v. Anderson, 100 Utah 
468, 116 P.2d 398; State v. Avery, Utah, 125 P.2d 803." 
Numerous cases have considered situations where there 
have been misnomers in the caption of complaints and in-
formation, and have found that they are not matters which 
affect the substance of the charge and consequently do not 
entitle an appellant to relief. Anno. 121 A.L.R. 1088. The 
Court of Military Appeals in several cases has ruled that 
where the charge sets out a violation of a specifically named 
section of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but the 
specification which is the factual allegation charging the 
crime, sets out an offense different than that named in the 
charge, an accused cannot complain if the substance of the 
offense set out in the specification states a crime. Thus, in 
United States v. Olson, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 460, 22 C.M.R. 250, 
where an improper allegation under the Articles of War 
was charged under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 
the court ruled that the misnomer of the offense did not 
preclude a valid conviction \vhere the specification clearly 
charged an offense. See also United States v. Deller, 3 
U.S.C.M.A. 409, 12 C.M.R. 165; United States v. Long, 
2 U.S.C.M.A. 60, 6 C.M.R. 60; United States v. Blevens, 
5 U.S.C.M.A. 480, 18 C.M.R. 104. Obviously, therefore, it 
is reasonably well settled in this jurisdiction and other juris-
dictions that a mere mistake of form in stating the sub-
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stance of the particulars alleged in the complaint will not 
entitle the appellant to relief. Consequently, not only is 
appellant without a claim of simple error upon which to 
predicate reversal, he has absolutely no basis for constitu-
tional con1plaint. 
POINT II. 
TI-lE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CONVICT THE DEFENDANT 
IN THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE PROVING HIS GUlL T. 
The appellant has taken the position that the trial court 
erred in finding him guilty, claiming that there was no 
evidence of his guilt which would justify the trial court in 
making such a finding, and consequently such action denied 
him due process of law. The appellant relies upon three 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court (among 
others) for his contention. Primarily the appellant relies 
upon Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 ( 1960). In that 
case the United States Supreme Court reversed a decision 
of the Police Court of Louisville, Kentucky, finding the ap-
pellant guilty of loitering and disorderly conduct. The only 
evidence of the petitioner's having committed the offense 
charged \\·as that the petitioner, in a cafe, was shuffling his 
feet on the dance floor, at which time officers arrested him 
and charged him with the crime from which he appealed. 
The evidence on behalf of the petitioner showed that he 
had been in the cafe waiting for a bus to his home, had 
money~ and \\·as usually regularly employed. The manager 
of the cafe "·here the accused was alleged to have engaged 
in disorderly conduct indicated that the accused had merely 
been standing in the middle of the dance floor patting his 
foot. Based upon this, the United States Supreme Court 
said that there \vas absolutely no evidence of the accused 
having ,·iolated the ordinances charged nor having com-
mitted any other crime. The court stated: 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
"Thus we find no evidence whatever in the record to support 
these convictions. Just as 'Conviction upon a charge not made 
would be sheer denial of due process,' so is it a violation of due 
process to convict and punish a man without evidence of his guilt." 
The second case of concern to the appellant's claim is 
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 ( 1961). There the 
defendants were convicted of the crime of disturbing the 
peace. The only evidence of the accused's guilt in that case 
was that they were sitting peaceably in a restaurant re-
served for white persons. There was no evidence of any 
disturbing conduct by the accused. The United States 
Supreme Court, therefore, determined that in the absence 
of any evidence the convictions must be reversed. A simi-
lar result occurred in Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154 
( 1962). It is admitted that if an individual is convicted in 
the absence of any evidence indicating his guilt, such an 
individual has been denied due process of law both under 
the Federal Constitution and the Constitution of the State 
of Utah. State v. Gordon, 28 Utah 15, 76 Pac. 882 ( 1904). 
However, the present case is not one where there is a com-
plete absence of evidence. Quite to the contrary, there is a 
clear showing of the appellant's guilt. He drove a pickup 
truck and trailer in Carbon County into the weighing sta-
tion and there it was found to weigh 15,400 pounds. The 
appellant contends there is no evidence to show that the 
vehicle was registered for any less amount. However, the 
evidence in fact shows two bases for a finding of the appel-
lant's registration. First, the figure 12,000 was stenciled on 
the side of the vehicle, which figure the Highway Patrol 
officer testified, without objection, indicated that the appel-
lant's vehicle was registered for 12,000 pounds gross laden 
weight. In addition, when the Highway Patrol officer cited 
the appellant, he stated in the appellant's presence that the 
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appellant's vehicle \vas registered for only 12,000 pounds. 
'Inc appellant made no response in protest to the assertion 
that his ve.hicle \\·as registered for only 12,000 pounds. Con-
sequently, there is a circumstance which constitutes an 
admission by the appellant as to the registration of his 
vehicles. Therefore, there is not the complete absence of 
evidence \vhich the appellant contends denied him due 
process of law. This case is substantially different than 
the case of Thompson v. Louisville, supra. Nor does that 
case go as far as appellant would contend. Thus, in Anno. 
80 A.L.R.2d 1362, 1375 discussing the problem of a convic-
tion of a criminal offense without evidence as being a denial 
of due process of law, the Annotation states with reference 
to the effect of Thompson v. Louisville : 
Hln holding in Thompson v Louisville ( 1960) 362 US 199, 
4 L ed 2d 654, 80 S Ct 624, 80 ALR2d 1, that the due process 
guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment required reversal of a 
state court conviction of crime where the prosecution introduced 
no eYidence, the United States Supreme Court stated for the first 
time a rule binding state convictions by constitutional limitations 
respecting quantum of evidence. If Thompson is to be regarded 
as indicating the Supreme Court's acceptance of the role of re-
,·iewer of sufficiency of the evidence whenever it is asked to over-
tum on due process grounds a state conviction, then, manifestly, 
the decision is of far-reaching importance, throwing grave doubt 
upon the continued authoritative effect of existing law as to the 
scope of Supreme Court review. 
"But there is sound reason to believe that Thompson is not to be 
so regarded, but on the contrary is to be viewed as reaching only 
the very rare conviction which, like the conviction involved in 
Thompson, is classifiable as a 'no evidence' case. It is submitted 
that no change in scope of review is involved in Supreme Court 
examination of the record in a criminal case to determine whether 
there was any evidence to support the conviction, so long as the 
court's consideration of the quantum of evidence issue stops when 
it has determined that there is not a total lack of evidence on 
behalf of the prosecution. And such a limited examination of the 
record would seem fully consonant with the principle, recognized 
by the Supren1e Court, that in its review of a conviction of crime, 
regard for the requirements of due process inescapably imposes 
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upon it an exercise of judgment upon the 'whole course of the pro-
ceedings' in order to ascertain whether they offend those canons 
of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of 
English-speaking people even toward those charged with the most 
heinous offenses." 
The present case is not a situation where there is not any 
evidence of the accused's guilt. Quite to the contrary, the 
only evidence received by the court is evidence of the ac-
cused's guilt, and although admittedly it is a short record 
in the instant case, the evidence clearly provides a basis for 
the trial court's decision, and the appellant cannot be said 
to have been denied due process of law. 
POINT III. 
41-1-127, U.C.A. 1953, PROVIDING FOR THE REGISTRA-
TION OF CERTAIN MOTOR VEHICLES, IS NOT UNCON-
STITUTIONAL, AND THE APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO 
COMPLY WITH THE REGISTRATION PROVISIONS OF 
THAT STATUTE WARRANTED HIS CONVICTION UNDER 
THE PROVISIONS OF 41-1-128, U.C.A. 1953. 
41-1-127, U.C.A. 1953, establishes the registration re-
quirements for motor vehicles operating on the highways 
of the State of Utah. 41-1-127 (f) establishes registration 
fees and requirements of registration based on gross laden 
weight. 41-1-127, U.C.A. 1953, as it is presently written, 
was enacted by Laws of Utah 1963, Chapter 67, Section 1, 
and therefore was not in effect at the time the accused was 
charged and at the time the offense with which he was 
charged was committed. The provisions of 41-1-127(£), 
which were in effect at the time the instant offense was com-
mitted, read as follows in its material part: 
"A registration fee on all motor vehicles designed, used, or 
maintained for the transportation of passengers for hire or for the 
transportation of property, based on gross laden weight as set forth 
in the licensee's application for registration, unless exempt under 
section 41-1-19, or unless complying with the provisions of sec-
tion 41-1-88. 
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"\\'h('rt' motor vehicles, except passenger cars, are operated in 
con1bination with semitrailers or trailers (including house trailers), 
each such n1otor vehicle shall be required to register for the total 
gross laden weight of all units of said combination. ~set of ide~­
tification plates shall be issued for each motor vehicle so regts-
tered." 
Section 41-1-128, U.C.A. 1953, makes it illegal to oper-
ate a vehicle in violation of the provisions of 41-1-127, 
LJ.C.A. 1953. The appellant has contended that 41-1-127 
as it existed at the time of the instant offense was uncon-
stitutional. Appellant's contention is that the law is dis-
criminatory and arbitrary and, therefore, is in violation of 
Article I, Section 24, of the Utah Constitution providing 
for uniform legislation, and the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution providing for the equal pro-
tection of the laws. Appellant's major argument is that, to 
the extent that passenger cars when operated in combina-
tion with trailers are excluded from the provisions of 41-1-
127(f), U.C.A. 1953, and pickup trucks, which the appel-
lant "·as operating, are not, the statute is arbitrary and 
capricious and there is no justification for the distinction. 
The general rule relating to the powers of the Legislature 
to enact regulatory laws and revenue producing laws based 
upon the operation of vehicles on State highways is set forth 
in 60 C.J .S., Motor Vehicles, Sec. 138: 
".-\ provision for license fees for motor vehicles must not dis-
criminate in respect of amount against certain classes without rea-
son and without relation to the general purpose of the motor 
vehicle la,,·s; but the mere fact that the amount of the license fee 
or ta..x imposed on one class of motor vehicle owners or operators 
is different from that imposed on another class does not render a 
regulation invalid \vhere the classification is a reasonable one and 
all owners or operators within each class are treated alike, even 
though the classification may cause a disproportionate payment of 
taxes by isolated individuals in such classes. 
"Regulations haYe been held valid as not being unreasonable, 
discriminatory, or violative of constitutional provisions which base 
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or grade the amount of the license fee or tax according to the type, 
size, weight, according to the capacity or load, or according to the 
seating capacity of the particular vehicle, or, in the case of jitneys 
and like vehicles, according to the amount charged for transporta-
tion.***" 
This court has recognized the validity of provisions 
regulating the operation of motor vehicles on the highway 
and requiring special registration permits based upon the 
weight or other nature of the vehicle being operated. In 
Carter v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 96, 96 P.2d 727 
(1939), this court considered the provisions of 41-1-127, 
U.C.A. 1953, as then written. The court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the breakdown based upon gross weight, 
although the court did strike down a provision relating to 
assessment based upon the fuel used as not being germane 
to the title of the legislation. In affirming the constitution-
ality of the Act so far as it based registration and regula-
tion on theory of weight or vehicle use, the court stated: 
"* * * The Legislature determines the lines of separation between 
classes. That is their prerogative, and the courts have no right' to 
interfere on any theory that those lines were improperly placed-
that the weights selected for a division into classes were not prop-
erly selected. Presumably the Legislature had the necessary in-
formation before it to justify such segregation into classes. It is 
obvious that the ground of difference between classes has a fair 
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, that is, to 
regulation based upon the wear and tear to which the roads are 
subjected by the licensee. The cases are many upholding such a 
classification. People v. Deep Rock Oil Corporation, 343 Ill 388, 
175 NE 572 ~ Morf v. Bingaman, 298 LrS 407, 56 S Ct 756,80 Led 
1245; Ogilvie v. Hailey, 141 Tenn 392,210 SW 645; Raymon~ v. 
Holn1, 165 Minn 215, 206 NW 166; McReavy v. Holm, 166 Mmn 
22, 206 NW 942; Wilson v. State, 143 Tenn 55, 224 SW 168; Ard 
v. People, 66 Colo 480, 182 P 892; Kane v. Tilas, 81 NJL 594, 
80 A 453, LRA1917B 553, Ann Cas 1912D 237; and Camas Stage 
Co. v. Kozer, 104 Or 600,209 P 95,25 ALR 27. 
"Now paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 133, are a continua-
tion of the same principle. Presumably the Legislature had before 
it facts justifying the conclusion that vehicles of a weight of 13,000 
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pounds and more, and of 20,000 pounds and more, are excep-
tionally injurious to the highways, and therefore they should pay 
an additional license fee to compensate for that extra injury. We 
as ;t court cannot gainsay that. Even though we might believe it a 
'pilin~ on' of fees, the right ~o exercise its j~dgment lies with the 
Legislature. To hold otherwise would depnve that branch of our 
government of its independence." 
This court, therefore, recognized that the Legislature 
has substantial prerogatives in determining the classifica-
tions for regulatory legislation and that such legislation 
enjoys every presumption of constitutionality. Thomas v. 
Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 197 P.2d 477 
( 1948); Gubler v. Utah State Teachers' Retirement Board, 
113 Utah 188, 192 P.2d 580 ( 1948); Salt Lake City v. Tax 
Commission, 11 Utah 2d 359, 359 P.2d 397 ( 1961). More 
recently in Wycoff Company v. Public Service Commission, 
389 P.2d 57 (Utah 1964), this court had occasion to con-
sider an attack against the constitutionality of the Utah 
~[otor Carrier Act. In that case it was alleged that the 
Utah l\Iotor Carrier Act was unconstitutional because it 
exempted from coverage certain classes of vehicles, such 
as school vehicles, mail trucks, agricultural vehicles, news-
paper trucks, towing and wrecking trucks, etc. In that case 
the court stated in sustaining the constitutionality: 
. "We have given careful consideration to classes of transporta-
tion exempted under 54-6-12 and conclude that in each instance 
the classification is reasonable. For the most part, the transporta-
tion exempted is casual, seasonal, slow-moving, not on regular 
routes or schedules, frequently in special equipment, and for com-
paratively short distances. Each of the exemptions have been held 
reasonable by other courts." 
.\sa consequence, it appears that unless the action of the 
Legislature in carving out a particular exception in the cov-
erage of a statute has acted without any reasonable basis 
so that there is in fact no difference between the exempted 
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group and the non-exempted group, the legislation will 
be sustained. In State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d 
920, this court upheld a statute requiring that a license 
be obtained for commercial activities where the statute 
exempted commercial merchants dealing with agricultural 
products. The court held that the exemption was a reason-
able action for the Legislature to take. See also Garrett 
Freightlines v. State Tax Commission, 103 Utah 390, 135 
P.2d523, which upheld the Use Fuel Tax Act of 1941. The 
Supreme Court will not concern itself with the wisdom or 
policy of the law so long as there appears to be some reason-
able basis for the Legislature's classification. Hansen v. 
Public Employees' Retirement System, 122 Utah 44, 246 
P.2d 591. 
Clearly, there is an apparent justification for the Legis-
latures' exclusion of passenger vehicles when used in com-
bination with a trailer, while at the same time encompass-
ing a pickup truck or truck when used in combination with 
a trailer. First, it is obvious that the weight of a passenger 
vehicle will usually not be as great as the weight of a pickup 
truck or other such vehicle, and as a consequence, there will 
be less wear on the public roads. Secondly, passenger ve-
hicles are limited in their power output and are usually not 
capable of hauling large trailers, which means that where a 
passenger vehicle is used in combination with a trailer, the 
trailer would most probably be a small unit used casually 
for camping trips or recreation purposes. Third, the dis-
tance for which an automobile may be used to haul a trailer 
is substantially less than for a truck, because of the differ-
ence in the power of both vehicles. Consequently, extensive 
use of the public roads is less likely where a passenger ve-
hicle rather than a truck is hauling a trailer. Fourth, most 
families have passenger vehicles, and \vhen hauling a pas-
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srngcr vehicle and a trailer, it is usually for sporadic use for 
family purposes, whereas where an individual owns a truck 
or pickup truck \vhich is capable of hauling a large unit, it is 
most probable that the truck-trailer combination will be 
used more extensively and will not be the sporadic family 
type of use associated with passenger vehicle-trailer units. 
As noted in 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles, Sec. 138, supra, if 
there is a general purpose behind the Legislature's classi-
fication, the mere fact that in a particular instance there is 
a disproportionate amount of inconvenience to particular 
individuals fitting \vithin the class will not justify a deter-
mination that the legislation is unconstitutional. See also 
Prouty v. Coyne, 55 F.2d 289 (D.C.S.D.). 
Appellant's argument that the subsequent amendment 
to i-1-1-127 (f), U.C.A. 1953, by the Legislature in 1963 
indicates the Legislature felt the previous enactment to be 
unconstitutional is without merit. The previous provision 
had been on the books some four years, and there is nothing 
in the legislative journals nor the title of the amendatory 
bill (see La\\·s of Utah 1963, Chapter 67, Sec. 1), which 
\rould lead to the conclusion that the Legislature felt its 
previous enactment to be unconstitutional. The Legislature 
may, for the purposes of legislative policy, effect changes in 
statutes from time to time as the reasonable discretion of 
the Legislature dictates, \Vithout it being inferred that any 
previous action of the Legislature was contrary to constitu-
tional principles. As noted above, there are substantial rea-
sons supporting the classification that the Legislature had 
previously established. By the same token, the Legislature 
may feel that there are other justifications which warrant 
some different classification. However, neither situation 
necessarily implies arbitrary action on the part of the Legis-
lature. Consequently. it is clear that the appellant's chal-
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lenge to the constitutionality of 41-1-127 (f), U.C.A. 1953, 
as it existed at the time of the offense charged, is without 
merit. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant has had two full trials on the issue of his 
guilt or innocence of the crime charged and has had full 
exploration of his recourse in the trial courts. A thorough 
analysis of his claims for relief before this court demon-
strates that there is no merit to the appellant's appeal. Con-
sequently, this court should affirm the conviction. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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